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1. INTRODUCTION
When the Netherlands Society of International Law (Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Internationaal Recht) was founded a century ago, Dutch legal doctrine 
was divided on the issue whether treaties had the force of law in the Nether-
lands or had to be implemented by national legislation in order to make their 
contents binding on natural and legal persons. By then dualistic theories on the 
relationship between international and domestic law had been blowing over from 
Germany and Italy. Although many scholars had become enchanted – and oth-
ers haunted – by those theories, one will look in vain for contributions on this 
controversy in the proceedings of the Netherlands Society of International Law.1 
I would guess that this is not a coincidence. Dualistic theories have always been 
foreign to Dutch case law and most members of the society will only have been 
aware of the armchair nature of these theories.2 In the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands the relationship between international and domestic law is deeply rooted 
in the monistic tradition. From times immemorial, the Dutch courts have been 
applying treaty law and customary international law. The only lasting impact that 
dualistic theories have had on Dutch case law was that they made the courts more 
aware of their attitude towards international law. In the ﬁrst decades of the 20th 
century the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) 
passed a couple of judgments in which it made it explicit that, according to Dutch 
constitutional law, lawfully concluded treaties as such were binding on citizens, 
thus rejecting any theory which claimed that the content of a treaty could only be 
binding on persons to the extent that this content was embodied in national law.3 
That the courts were empowered to apply customary international law as such 
has never been seriously challenged, so there was no need for them to clarify 
their position on this issue.
Only thorough historical research could reveal which role the Netherlands 
Society of International Law and its members have played over the years in 
keeping the courts on the right track with regard to the application of public 
international law. But from legal history it is abundantly clear that several of 
its members were involved from the very start in the 1953 amendment of the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which made it one of the most 
völkerrechtsfreundliche constitutions in the world. In this article I will explore 
1.  The Netherlands Lawyers’ Association (Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging), on the other 
hand, discussed the controversy at its annual meeting of 1937 on the basis of reports presented 
by Telders and Verzijl (see Handelingen der Nederlandsche Juristen-Vereeniging (Proceedings of 
the Netherlands Lawyers’ Association) No. 67 (1937), part I). An English translation of the latter 
report is included in J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (Leiden, Sijthoff 
1968) pp. 106-146.
2.  Cf. A.A.H. Struycken, Grondwetsherziening: Theorie en praktijk (Revision of the Constitu-
tion: Theory and Practice) (Arnhem, Gouda Quint 1913) pp. 71-72.
3.  Hoge Raad, 25 May 1906, W (Weekblad van het Recht) 8383; Hoge Raad, 3 March 1919, 
NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 1919, p. 371 (grenstractaat Aken).
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the ways in which Dutch courts have been giving effect to public international 
law since the middle of the 20th century. I will start with a survey of the consti-
tutional background.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The 1953, 1956 and 1983 amendments of the Constitution
Until 1953 the effect of international law within the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
was largely determined by unwritten constitutional law and case law.4 In part it 
still is. But in 1953 the provisions on foreign relations in the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands were signiﬁcantly amended.5 Ever since, the articles 
on foreign relations open with the constitutional duty of the Government to pro-
mote the development of the international rule of law.6 The Kingdom may even 
become a party to treaties7 which are inconsistent with the Constitution, pro-
vided that those treaties have been approved by both Houses of Parliament with a 
majority of at least two thirds of the votes cast. So, the rigid and time-consuming 
procedure that has to be followed in case of a revision of the Constitution itself is 
no impediment to entering into treaties which depart from the Constitution.8 Fur-
thermore, the 1953 amendment declared treaties and resolutions of international 
organizations to be binding on all persons insofar as they had been published. 
One of the most remarkable renewals was the provision that national legislation – 
including the Constitution, Acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation – was 
inapplicable if application would be incompatible with treaties and resolutions 
4.  See, e.g., L. Erades and W.L. Gould, The Relation between International Law and Munici-
pal Law in the Netherlands and the United States (Leiden, Sijthoff 1961).
5.  For a translation and discussion of the 1953 amendment see H.F. van Panhuys, ‘The Neth-
erlands Constitution and International Law’, 47 AJIL (1953) pp. 537-558.
6.  Currently Art. 90 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Constitution of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands) (hereafter, Const.). For an analysis of this provision see L.F.M. Bes-
selink, ‘The Constitutional Duty to Promote the Development of the International Legal Order: 
The Signiﬁcance and Meaning of Article 90 of the Netherlands Constitution’, 34 NYIL (2003) 
pp. 89-138.
7.  In the Netherlands Constitution the concept of a treaty has the same (broad) sense as in 
international law. A treaty in this sense may be deﬁned as ‘an expression of concurring wills 
attributable to two or more subjects of international law and intended to have legal effects under 
the rules of international law’ (P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn. (London, 
Kegan Paul International 1995) p. 30).
8.  Currently Art. 91(3) Const. Since 1954 the relationships between the Netherlands and the 
Caribbean parts of the Kingdom are regulated by the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden). As the Charter does not contain a provision simi-
lar to Art. 91(3) Const., it has to be presumed that the Kingdom may not become a party to a 
treaty which departs from the Charter until the Charter is amended (Kamerstukken (Parliamentary 
Papers) I 1955/56, 4133 (R 19), no. 151, p. 3; ibid., no. 151a, p. 3; Handelingen (Parliamentary 
Proceedings) I 1955/56, p. 387; Kamerstukken I 1956, 4402 (R 43) No. 7a, p. 2).
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of international organizations which had been published, no matter whether the 
legislation had come into force before or after the publication of the treaty or 
resolution.9 The only requirements were that the treaty or resolution had entered 
into force for the Kingdom of the Netherlands and was adequately published. The 
duty of the courts to apply treaty law10 did not (and still does not) depend on the 
question whether the Government in ratifying or otherwise concluding the treaty 
might have exceeded the limits of its treaty-making power.11
Already three years later, in 1956, the constitutional provisions on international 
relations were again amended.12 Although this revision was merely supposed to 
repair technical ﬂaws in the 1953 amendment and not to touch on its essence, 
the Constitution as amended in 1956 was – and still is – less friendly or open 
towards international law than its predecessor. This is the result of the introduc-
tion of the concept of self-executing provisions of treaty law in the Constitution. 
Since the 1956 amendment the Dutch Constitution lays down that (only) self-
executing provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international organizations, 
after being published, are binding on everyone and prevail over national legisla-
tion.13 Of course the Constitution does not use the English word ‘self-executing’. 
Instead it refers to provisions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of 
their contents (bepalingen die naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden). 
From the legal history of the 1956 amendment it is clear that this phrasing was 
meant to be a description of the concept of a self-executing provision.14 The rea-
sons for introducing this concept in the Constitution and the way it is dealt with 
by the courts will be discussed in section 3.
In 1983 the Constitution underwent a general revision.15 The articles on inter-
national relations were smoothed over and shortened, but their substance was 
9.  Hereafter I will use the term ‘supremacy clause’ to refer to this provision, both in its origi-
nal and its subsequent wording.
10.  In this article ‘treaty law’ is used as an umbrella term for both treaties and resolutions of 
international organizations (which are adopted in pursuance of a treaty).
11.  Currently Art. 120 Const. Cf. Hoge Raad, 31 August 1972, NJ 1973, no. 4; 4 NYIL (1973) 
p. 392.
12.  For a translation and discussion of the 1956 amendment see H.F. van Panhuys, ‘The Neth-
erlands Constitution and International Law: A Decade of Experience’, 58 AJIL (1964) pp. 88-108.
13.  Currently Arts. 93 and 94 Const. Since the 1983 amendment these Articles read as fol-
lows:
Art. 93: ‘Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international organizations, which may be 
binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been pub-
lished.’
Art. 94: ‘Legal provisions in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such applica-
tion is in conﬂict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international organizations that are 
binding on all persons.’
14.  See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1955/56, 4133 (R 19), no. 4, pp. 13-15.
15.  Cf. M.C.B. Burkens, ‘The Complete Revision of the Dutch Constitution’, 29 NILR (1982) 
pp. 324-336.
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mainly left untouched.16 Some Members of Parliament had proposed to extend 
the ‘supremacy clause’ to all provisions of treaties and of resolutions of inter-
national organizations as well as to general rules of international law (algemene 
regels van volkenrecht). But the Government opposed both proposals. After it 
had assured the Lower House (Tweede Kamer) that it favoured a broad inter-
pretation of the concept of a self-executing provision, the ﬁrst proposal was 
withdrawn. An amendment to the effect that general rules of international law 
would be incorporated in the ‘supremacy clause’ was put to a vote, but rejected.17
2.2 Resolutions of international organizations
The Constitution puts beyond doubt that the Kingdom of the Netherlands may 
become a party to treaties in which international organizations are established 
or provided with legislative, executive or judicial powers.18 The term ‘interna-
tional organization’ as referred to in the Constitution has a very broad meaning. 
It  covers any entity (for instance, a full-blown organization, an international 
court or an intergovernmental committee) established by or pursuant to a treaty, 
which under public international law has the power to pass resolutions which are 
binding upon the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In so far as such resolutions are 
published and contain provisions which are self-executing, they may affect the 
rights and duties of natural and legal persons and will have supremacy over the 
Constitution, Acts of Parliament and other legal rules. Whether these provisions 
have or do not have the character of general regulations is irrelevant. Thus even 
resolutions that concern one or more speciﬁcally named or otherwise speciﬁed 
persons may count as resolutions which are binding on all persons within the 
meaning of the Constitution.19 UN Security Council resolutions 1192 (1998) and 
1688 (2006) are cases in point. The former concerned ‘the two persons charged 
with the bombing of Pan Am ﬂight 103’ and provided a legal basis for their trial 
before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. The latter allowed a chamber 
16.  Cf. E.A. Alkema, ‘Foreign Relations in the Netherlands Constitution of 1983’, 31 NILR 
(1984) pp. 307-331. The most important changes related to the basic rule that the Government 
shall not consent to a treaty or denounce it without the prior approval of the Staten-Generaal (i.e., 
the Dutch Parliament). As a result of the 1983 revision the exceptions to the requirement of prior 
approval and the ways in which approval may be granted, are no longer laid down in the Constitu-
tion itself, but in an Act of Parliament, viz. the Kingdom Act on Approval and Publication of Trea-
ties (Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen). Cf. J. Klabbers, ‘The New Dutch Law of 
the Approval of Treaties’, 44 ICLQ (1995) pp. 629-643.
17.  Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 049 (R 1100), nos. 14 and 18; Handelingen II 1979/80, 
pp. 4093, 4436, 4504.
18.  If the exercise of these powers will result in resolutions or decisions which depart from the 
Constitution (or which oblige the Kingdom to take measures that depart from the Constitution), 
such a treaty may only be entered into after it has been approved by both Houses with a majority 
of at least two thirds of the votes cast. See Art. 92 Const.
19.  Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 610, no. 3 pp. 5-6; Kamerstukken I 2007/08, 31 200 VII, B, 
p. 5.
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of the Freetown-based Special Court for Sierra Leone to sit in The Hague, in 
order to try the Liberian ‘former President Taylor’ for war crimes. Judgments of 
international tribunals may also contain rulings that are binding upon all persons 
within the meaning of the Constitution. Instances of these are the ﬁnal judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights in which a ruling is given on the question 
whether the Netherlands has violated the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950 with respect to the applicant and whether the applicant should be awarded 
compensation.20
Provisions of resolutions of international organizations which merely contain 
recommendations do not entail legal obligations for the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands and thus are a fortiori not binding on all persons. For this reason none of 
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are considered to 
be binding on all persons within the meaning of the Constitution.21 This is not to 
say that the Dutch courts have to ignore recommendations of international orga-
nizations and other instruments of soft law. Although courts are not obliged to 
comply with them, they frequently refer to those instruments when interpreting 
and applying binding rules of public international law.22
2.3 Customary international law and non-self-executing provisions
The 1953 amendment was silent on the force of customary international law 
in the Netherlands. Consequently it was left to the discretion of the courts to 
determine to what extent they could review Dutch law for its compatibility with 
customary international law.23 But when in 1956 the ‘supremacy clause’ was 
restricted to self-executing provisions of treaties and resolutions of international 
organizations, the Supreme Court reasoned a contrario that from the date that 
the 1956 amendment entered into force the Dutch courts were no longer allowed 
to review Dutch law for its incompatibility with either non-self-executing provi-
sions of treaty law or customary international law.24 In legal scholarship this is 
labelled the ‘Nyugat doctrine’, named after the case in which the Supreme Court 
has given this ruling. The Supreme Court upheld the ‘Nyugat doctrine’ in its 
famous judgment of 18 September 2001 in re Bouterse, arguing that according to 
the legal history of the 1983 revision of the Constitution the constitutional legis-
lature (grondwetgever) had not intended to modify this doctrine. In this judgment 
the Supreme Court ruled that it was not for the courts to exercise universal juris-
diction in torture cases or to apply the Torture Convention Act (Uitvoeringswet 
20.  J.W.A. Fleuren, Een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen (Treaty provisions that 
are binding on all persons) (The Hague, Boom Juridische uitgevers 2004) pp. 225-228.
21.  Hoge Raad, 7 November 1984, NJ 1985, no. 247; 17 NYIL (1986) p. 253.
22.  See, e.g., Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage (Court of Appeal of The Hague), 20 December 
2007, LJN BC0619, NJ 2008, no. 133 (SGP); Voorzieningenrechter Arrondissementsrechtbank 
Utrecht (Judge in interlocutory proceedings of the District Court of Utrecht), 6 April 2010, LJN 
BM0846.
23.  Hoge Raad, 6 March 1959, NJ 1962, no. 2; 10 NILR (1963) pp. 82 (Nyugat II).
24.  Ibid.
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Folteringsverdrag) to crimes that were committed before the Act had taken 
effect. The Supreme Court refrained from answering the question whether public 
international law favoured a different conclusion, because the courts were not 
allowed to test statutory limitations on retroactive force and jurisdiction against 
other rules of public international law than the self-executing provisions of treaty 
law mentioned in the ‘supremacy clause’.25
However, the Nyugat doctrine should not be overstretched. The doctrine does 
not alter the fact that all treaties, resolutions of international organizations and 
rules of customary international law which are binding upon the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands are part of the law of the land. Moreover, it appears from the legal 
history of the 1953, 1956 and 1983 amendments of the Constitution that within 
the legal order of the Kingdom of the Netherlands treaty law and customary inter-
national law have a higher ranking (i.e., have a higher hierarchical position) than 
legal rules of domestic origin. The introduction of the concept of self-executing 
provisions of treaties and resolutions of international organizations has merely 
imposed limitations on the powers of the courts to apply international law.26 Non-
self-executing provisions lack the force of law towards natural and legal persons 
and cannot prevent the application of national legal rules. They should neverthe-
less be implemented and administered by public authorities according to their 
competences, in so far as this is not precluded by the restrictions mentioned.27 
Nor is it lawful for public authorities to perform an action or to adopt a deci-
sion which is in conﬂict with customary international law, assuming that such 
an administrative act or decision is not prescribed as mandatory by legal rules of 
national origin.28 In a judgment of 10 November 1989 the Supreme Court even 
examined whether the decision of the Government, approved by Parliament, to 
conclude a treaty with the United States allowing the latter country to deploy 48 
cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on Dutch soil had been compatible with 
written as well as unwritten public international law.29
2.4 Community law
The Nyugat doctrine does not apply to Community law. The direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law is inspired by, but not dependant on, the Dutch 
Constitution. It was not by chance that the European Court of Justice gave its 
ﬁrst ruling on the direct effect of Community Law in a Dutch case: Van Gend 
25.  Hoge Raad, 18 September 2001, LJN AB1471, NJ 2002, no. 559; ILDC 80 (NL 2001) 
(Bouterse); Hoge Raad, 8 July 2008, LJN BC7418 (for a translation in English see LJN BG1476), 
RvdW (Rechtspraak van de Week) 2008, no. 761; ILDC 1071 (NL 2008).
26.  Fleuren, supra n. 20, pp. 338-340; J.G. Brouwer, ‘National Treaty Law and Practice: The 
Netherlands’, in D.B. Hollis, et al., eds, National Treaty Law and Practice (Leiden, Martinus 
Nijhoff 2005) p. 482 at pp. 498-499.
27.  KB (Koninklijk Besluit (Royal Decree)) 19 February 1993, AB (Administratiefrechtelijke 
Beslissingen) 1993, no. 385; KB 11 September 2007, Stb. (Staatsblad) 2007, no. 347.
28.  Kamerstukken I 1980/81, 15 049 (R 1100), no. 19, p. 1.
29.  Hoge Raad, 10 November 1989, NJ 1991, no. 248; 22 NYIL (1991) p. 453 (Kruisraketten).
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& Loos.30 As the then Court’s President (Donner) pointed out many years later, 
it was typical for a Dutch court to refer to the European Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling the question whether the article of the EEC Treaty that was 
at issue had ‘direct application within the territory of a Member State’. From the 
perspective of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands it was only 
natural to refer this question to the Court.31 Shortly afterwards it became estab-
lished case law of the Court of Justice that Community law is not only binding 
on the Member States and their citizens, but also has supremacy over the law 
of the Member States,32 including their constitutional law.33 Dutch courts have 
accepted this case law from the very beginning. At ﬁrst, it was assumed that this 
case law could easily be complied with because of the constitutional articles on 
self-executing provisions of treaties and resolutions of international organiza-
tions. But since a couple of decades the courts tend to endorse a doctrine that 
renders these articles virtually irrelevant when it comes to Community law. This 
doctrine points out that according to the case law of the European Court of Justice 
Community law has direct effect and supremacy per se and not in virtue of the 
constitutions of the EU Member States. From this it is inferred that the articles 
in the Constitution on self-executing provisions have no impact on the duty of 
the courts to apply Community law with supremacy over national law. So when 
it comes to Community law, the courts do not have to be bothered by the restric-
tions these or other articles in the Constitution impose on their powers to apply 
public international law.34 The Nyugat doctrine, for instance, does not affect their 
duty to test national law against unwritten rules and principles of Community 
law. In short, the practical importance of the constitutional articles on the effect 
of self-executing provisions is nowadays limited to treaties and resolutions which 
are not part of Community law.
3. SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS OF TREATY LAW
3.1 Rationale
For what reason was the concept of self-executing provisions of international 
law laid down in the Constitution, only three years after the 1953 amendment? 
Thus far, there were hardly any court rulings based on this amendment. Not 
30.  Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 
1.
31.  A.M. Donner, ‘Inleiding’ (= introduction to a special issue on the intertwinement of Com-
munity law and Dutch law), 141 RM Themis (Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis) (1980) p. 354 at 
p. 359.
32.  Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
33.  Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfur- und Vorratstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.
34.  Hoge Raad, 2 November 2004, LJN AR1797, NJ 2005, no. 80.
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surprisingly there is nothing to suggest that the embodiment of the concept in 
the Constitution was prompted by unsatisfactory case law. Insofar as the 1953 
revision provided that treaties and decisions of international organizations were 
binding on all persons after they had been published, the motive for explicitly 
limiting this effect to self-executing provisions of treaties and decisions seems 
to have been sheer perfectionism. Of course, to the extent that the objective of 
a provision of treaty law can only be attained by enacting national laws and not 
through direct application by domestic courts, the provision itself will not affect 
the rights and duties of persons. But until the 1956 amendment this went without 
saying.35 The restriction of the ‘supremacy clause’ to self-executing provisions of 
treaty law was prompted by a generally accepted rationale of the concept, namely 
the separation of powers within a state.36 This restriction was introduced in order 
to prevent the courts from having to disapply a national law even in those cases 
where the treaty or resolution in question did not itself contain any rules which 
the courts could apply instead of this law. In such cases a legal vacuum may 
arise which the courts can only ﬁll by creating law themselves and thus making 
choices that should be left to the legislature.37
3.2 Criteria
Whether a provision of treaty law is binding on all persons within the meaning of 
the Constitution is determined by the courts. An opinion of the Government on 
the matter may be taken into account, but is not decisive.38 Although in numer-
ous cases the courts have ruled on the question whether or not a treaty provision 
at hand was self-executing, only a few judgments contain clear-cut criteria.39 
A landmark judgment in this respect was delivered by the Supreme Court on 
30 May 1986 regarding the right to strike as contained in Article 6(4) of the 
European Social Charter (ESC). In the past attempts to regulate the right to col-
lective action in an Act of Parliament had failed. Now the Supreme Court used 
this treaty provision to undo the omission. It ruled that Article 6(4) of the ESC 
was self-executing and that trade unions may rely upon this provision in order 
to claim the lawfulness of strikes and other means of collective action. At the 
time the Government had submitted the ESC to Parliament for approval, it had 
pointed out that the ESC could not be invoked by individuals before domestic 
courts, because the contracting parties had not intended the provisions of the ESC 
35.  Fleuren, supra n. 20, pp. 201-202. 
36.  On this rationale see C.M. Vázquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’, 
89 AJIL (1995) pp. 695-723.
37.  Kamerstukken II 1955/56, 4133 (R 19), no. 4, pp. 13-14. See also H.F. van Panhuys, ‘De 
regeling der buitenlandse betrekkingen in de Nederlandse grondwet’ (‘Regulating foreign relations 
in the Netherlands Constitution’), Mededelingen NVIR No. 34 (1955) p. 28 at p. 50.
38.  Kamerstukken II 1955/56, 4133 (R 19), no. 7, p. 4; Handelingen II 1955/56, p. 800; Han-
delingen II 1979/80, pp. 4433 and 4441.
39.  Case law on this question is extensively discussed in Fleuren, supra n. 20, pp. 240-310.
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to have direct effect.40 Although the Supreme Court itself had in some previous 
judgments attached considerable weight to the (supposed) intention of the con-
tracting parties in determining whether a treaty provision was self-executing,41 it 
now stripped the criterion of the signiﬁcance it once had:
‘Whether or not the contracting parties intended Article 6(4) of the ESC to have 
direct effect is not relevant since it cannot be inferred either from the text or from the 
history of the Charter that they have agreed that it is not allowed to give direct effect 
to Article 6(4). In view of this state of affairs, only the content of the provision is 
decisive under Dutch law: does it oblige the Dutch legislature to enact national rules 
of a given content or scope or is it of such a kind that the provision can simply func-
tion as law in the national legal order?’42
This quotation as well as other parts of the judgment suggest that the question 
whether the contracting parties intended the provision to have direct effect is 
only relevant in the – quite hypothetical – case that the States Parties have agreed 
that it shall be prohibited from giving direct effect to the provision at hand. Yet 
in a subsequent judgment the Supreme Court clariﬁed that the intention of the 
contracting parties may also be decisive in cases where they wanted the provi-
sions to be self-executing.43 Apart from the cases where giving direct effect to a 
provision of treaty law is intended or forbidden by the contracting parties, Dutch 
courts should rely on the content of the provision. The ﬁrst question to be asked is 
whether the treaty imposes on the state an obligation to enact national legal rules 
in order to implement the provision at issue. If so, Dutch courts will usually not 
deem the provision to be self-executing. In case the state is not obliged to imple-
ment the provision by adopting national legal rules, the courts should consider 
whether the provision itself can function as law, i.e., whether the provision can 
be implemented by allowing the courts to apply it. This yardstick is rather ﬂex-
ible, so not surprisingly its employment in Dutch case law has not always been 
consistent.44
Nevertheless, the criteria as developed in the Supreme Court’s judgment on 
the right to strike have great potential, as is illustrated by a ruling of the Admin-
istrative Law Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van 
de Raad van State) dated 15 September 2004. In the preceding year the Road 
Widening Emergency Act (Spoedwet wegverbreding) was adopted in order to 
reduce the daily tailbacks on a number of main roads in the Netherlands. When 
under this act the Minister for Transport had enacted a decree that arranged for 
40.  Kamerstukken II 1965/66, 8606 (R 533), no. 3, p. 2; Kamerstukken II 1966/67, 8606 
(R 533), no. 6, p. 1; Handelingen II 1977/78, p. 1898.
41.  Hoge Raad, 1 June 1956, NJ 1958, no. 424 (Cognac Vieux II); Hoge Raad, 18 May 1962, 
NJ 1965, no. 115 (Bosch); Hoge Raad, 8 November 1968, NJ 1969, no. 10 (Portalon).
42.  Hoge Raad, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, no. 688; 18 NYIL (1987) pp. 389-397 (Spoorwegsta-
king).
43.  Hoge Raad, 18 April 1995, NJ 1995, no. 619.
44.  Supra n. 39.
NILR_2010-2.indb   254 6-7-2010   11:57:36
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DUTCH COURTS 255NILR 2010
the adjustment of certain road sections to the effect that hard shoulders could be 
used as trafﬁc lanes during rush hour, several interest groups and private persons 
lodged an appeal. The Court examined the decree for compatibility with, inter 
alia, the European Agreement on Main International Trafﬁc Arteries 1975 and 
its annexes, especially the provisions concerning road construction and the mini-
mum width of hard shoulders and trafﬁc lanes. Although the Court considered 
some of those provisions to be mere recommendations, it held that the Agree-
ment nevertheless required a mandatory balancing of interests (viz. road safety, 
environmental protection, the free ﬂow of trafﬁc, the interest of road users) and 
that its provisions were to this extent applicable by the courts and binding on all 
persons within the meaning of the Constitution. The Court rejected the defence 
that the Agreement would only entail obligations for contracting parties: ‘That 
the Agreement may impose obligations on states only, as the defendant argues, 
does not necessarily imply that they cannot be regarded as binding on everyone.’ 
The challenged decree was nulliﬁed because the Minister of Transport, who had 
attached overriding importance to the free ﬂow of trafﬁc, failed to argue convinc-
ingly that the decree was based on a well-balanced weighing of interests.45
3.3 Interpretation and application
3.3.1 Preliminaries
When a court is considering the application of a self-executing provision, it has to 
establish the extent of the obligations that this provision imposes on the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands. In this respect several preliminary questions may arise. Has 
the treaty or resolution at issue entered into force for the Kingdom?46 Is it bind-
ing on its whole territory or does it not concern the part of the Kingdom in which 
the court has jurisdiction? In case the provision under consideration pertains to 
a treaty, the courts have to ascertain whether reservations to the treaty have been 
made which might have modiﬁed this provision for the Kingdom.47 The courts 
are even empowered to apply provisions of treaties which have not yet entered 
into force, viz. in case the Kingdom has agreed to their provisional application. 
So, to the extent that provisionally applied treaty provisions are of a self-execut-
ing nature, they are binding on all persons and have supremacy over Dutch law.48 
45.  Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State 15 September 2004, AB 2005, no. 12; 
ILDC 129 (NL 2004) (Spoedwet wegverbreding).
46.  See, e.g., Hoge Raad, 17 March 1967, NJ 1967, no. 237; Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State, 5 July 1979, AB 1980, no. 414; Hoge Raad, 7 November 1984, NJ 1985, 
no. 247; NYIL 1986 p. 253; Hoge Raad, 7 May 1996, NJ 1996, no. 584; Hoge Raad, 29 May 1996, 
NJ 1996, no. 556.
47.  See, e.g., Hoge Raad, 6 December 1983, NJ 1984, no. 557; Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State, 2 October 1989, AB 1990, no. 387; Hoge Raad, 21 May 1991, AB 1992, 
no. 15; Hoge Raad, 24 November 2000, LJN AA8448, NJ 2001, no. 376, paras. 4.2 and 5.4.
48.  In Art. 15 Kingdom Act on the Approval and Publication of Treaties (Rijkswet goedkeu-
ring en bekendmaking verdragen) some limitations have been set on the powers of the Govern-
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If a court is confronted with two different treaties which would lead to conﬂicting 
results if they were both applied simultaneously, the court has to establish which 
treaty will prevail according to the law of treaties, especially Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.49 If the law of treaties does not 
provide a solution to the conﬂict of treaty obligations, the court will have to give 
preference to one of the conﬂicting treaty obligations on the basis of weighing 
the various interests involved. For example, the treaty obligation to extradite or 
surrender an accused may yield to a human rights treaty if the most basic rights 
which the accused enjoys under this treaty are in danger of being violated by the 
requesting state.50
In dealing with the preliminaries the courts will have to take the ﬁnal provi-
sions of a treaty as well as the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties fully into account. However, scholars and courts should not be tempted 
to consider provisions on, inter alia, the conclusion, provisional application, 
entry into force, validity, and determination of treaties as self-executing. Those 
provisions deal with questions that have to be answered before the question of 
whether the substantive parts of a treaty or resolution are self-executing becomes 
relevant.51
3.3.2 Interpretation
In so far as rules of public international law are binding upon the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, they are part of the law that is in force within the Kingdom. Trans-
formation into national law is not taking place. Of course legislation may be 
enacted to implement these rules, but such legislation does not deprive them from 
their public international law character within the state. Consequently courts have 
to ascertain the meaning which these rules have according to public international 
law when they consider applying them or taking them into account. Human rights 
treaties are not exceptions to this rule. Although human rights treaties contain 
ment to bind the Kingdom to the provisional application of treaties, but it has to be assumed that 
an omission by the Government to observe these limitations would not impair the authority of the 
courts to apply the treaties concerned. See Kamerstukken I 1983/84, 17 798 (R 1227), no. 44a, 
p. 5; Kamerstukken II 1988/89, 21 214 (R 1375), no. 3, p. 32. Cf. E.W. Vierdag, ‘Spanningen tus-
sen recht en praktijk in het verdragenrecht’ (‘Tensions between the law and practice in the law of 
treaties’), Mededelingen NVIR No. 99 (1989) p. 1 at pp. 29 et seq.; J.W.A. Fleuren, ‘Voorlopige 
toepassing van verdragen in constitutioneel perspectief’ (‘Provisional applications of treaties in a 
constitutional perspective’), 156 RM Themis (1995) pp. 247-262.
49.  See, e.g., Hoge Raad, 5 January 1990, NJ 1991, no. 591; NYIL 1991 p. 422; Hoge Raad, 
15 October 1996, NJ 1997, no. 533; Arrondissementsrechtbank’s-Gravenhage (District Court of 
The Hague), 3 February 2010, LJN BL1862.
50.  Hoge Raad, 30 March 1990, NJ 1991, no. 249 (Short); Hoge Raad, 15 September 2006, 
LJN AV7387, NJ 2007, no. 277 (Kesbir). See also J.B. Mus, Verdragsconﬂicten voor de Neder-
landse rechter (Conﬂicts of Treaties in Dutch Courts) (Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1996) and 
J.B. Mus, ‘Conﬂicts between Treaties in International Law’, 45 NILR (1998) pp. 208-232.
51.  Cf ., Mus 1996, supra n. 50, p. 87.
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minimum standards which do not preclude states from granting a higher level 
of protection to their citizens, it is not for the courts to achieve a higher level of 
protection by construing the provisions of such treaties in a manner which in no 
way can be justiﬁed by reference to the meaning these provisions have or rea-
sonably may have according to public international law. This is especially true 
when the provisions are self-executing and may thus set aside Acts of Parliament 
and even the Constitution itself. So the Supreme Court was right when it ruled 
in its judgment of 10 August 2001 that Dutch courts are not allowed to make 
the application of a national legal provision incompatible with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 by reading in the right to family 
life as contained in this article a higher level of protection than may be assumed 
on the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.52 This is not 
to say that Dutch courts are or should be conservative in their interpretation of 
rules of public international law. But they will usually try to establish a plausible 
interpretation. In case an earlier construction is no longer sustainable in the light 
of later developments in international law – for instance, the recent case law of 
an international tribunal – it will be reviewed.53
3.3.3 Impact
Courts should use extra care when they are construing self-executing provisions 
of treaty law which might restrict personal rights and liberties. Depending on 
their contents, self-executing provisions of treaty law may be invoked by legal 
and natural persons against national and local authorities and vice versa, or they 
may be invoked between legal or natural persons. Well-known examples of the 
different categories are to be found in human rights treaties, treaties and reso-
lutions regarding extradition and surrender of accused persons, and treaties on 
private international law. Less known is the impact that self-executing provisions 
of human rights treaties may have on the legal relationships between citizens. In 
case a human rights treaty imposes on the States Parties an obligation to recog-
nize or ensure rights which individuals should be able to exercise towards other 
persons, then considering the provisions involved to be self-executing will nor-
mally have the effect that these rights become enforceable. Several examples of 
this are to be found in Dutch case law. To the extent that according to the rulings 
of the European Court of Human Rights Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights contains the right of access to one’s children, one parent may 
invoke this right against the other parent, since Article 8 is held to be self-exe-
cuting.54 Article 6(4) ESC is also considered to be self-executing (see supra 3.2), 
so employers will have to respect the right to collective action, including the 
right to strike, as it may be exercised by workers and trade unions under this 
52.  Hoge Raad, 10 August 2001, LJN ZC3598, NJ 2002, no. 278.
53.  Hoge Raad, 10 November 1989, NJ 1990, no. 628.
54.  See, e.g., Hoge Raad, 22 February 1985, NJ 1986, no. 3.
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provision. In a recent case the Supreme Court held Article 7(c) of the UN Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 
to be self-executing. According to this provision the States Parties shall ensure 
to women, on equal terms with men, the right to participate in non-governmental 
organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the 
country. Although the Supreme Court basically had to give a ruling on the ques-
tion whether the Dutch state should take effective measures against a (orthodox) 
political party which excluded women from being nominated to stand in general 
elections, the court made it clear that also the party itself was violating the right 
that the provision at issue guaranteed to women.55
3.3.4 Judicial restraint
The main reason why the concept of a self-executing provision was introduced 
in the 1956 amendment of the Constitution was to prevent that the application 
of treaty law would now and then lead to lacunae which could only be ﬁlled by 
judge-made law (see supra 3.1). In this respect the concept has not fully met its 
purpose. The courts have been faced with a number of cases where they had to 
refrain from applying a treaty provision that was considered to be self-executing, 
precisely because otherwise they would have to make choices that should be left 
to the legislature. This is due to the increasing impact that human rights treaties 
are having on Dutch law. Dutch courts are not allowed to review the constitu-
tionality of Acts of Parliament. So they can neither examine an Act of Parliament 
for compatibility with fundamental rights that are enshrined in the Constitution.56 
As a consequence, the judicial power to test the application of Acts of Parlia-
ment against self-executing provisions of human rights treaties has become very 
important. In quite a few cases the courts have held the law contained in an Act 
of Parliament to be in conﬂict with such treaties, notably the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 1950 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966, and have provided remedies. However, on several occasions where 
Dutch law was not in accordance with self-executing provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, courts have refused to apply the self-executing provision concerned, 
arguing that to remove the inconsistencies would involve choices that should be 
left to the legislature. Whether or not the courts are prepared to rectify any dis-
crepancies between the law embodied in an Act of Parliament, on the one hand, 
and a self-executing treaty provision on the other, depends on whether there is a 
possible solution that ﬁts in with the history and system of the law in question and 
whether the consequences of this solution are foreseeable. When several solu-
tions are possible and not one of them meets this test, the courts tend to abstain 
55.  Hoge Raad, 9 April 2010, LJN BK4549, RvdW 2010, no. 506 (SGP).
56.  Art. 120 Const. A proposal to empower the courts to review Acts of Parliament for con-
ﬂict with fundamental constitutional rights is currently under consideration. See Stb. 2009, no. 120.
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from making a choice between them. This case law was initiated by the Supreme 
Court in 1984.57 Several years later the Supreme Court made an important quali-
ﬁcation. According to a judgment of 12 May 1999 this abstinence is a matter of 
judicial restraint. Although the courts are constitutionally empowered to resolve 
any inconsistencies between national law and self-executing provisions of treaty 
law, they (initially) consider it prudent not to exercise this power. But should the 
legislature keep doing nothing about the problem, then it is quite possible that the 
courts in future cases will provide a solution themselves.58
4. CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
 NATIONAL LAW
In the preceding sections we have discussed the application of public interna-
tional law itself. But in many cases Dutch courts simply ensure that rules of 
public international law are being observed by construing and applying national 
law in such a manner that a conﬂict with those rules is avoided. This technique 
is used by domestic courts throughout the world, even (or may be one should 
say especially) in states where treaty law is not automatically incorporated in the 
national legal order (such as, for instance, in the United Kingdom). In legal doc-
trine it is often based on the presumption that the state or the legislature has not 
intended to violate international law. To the extent that rules of public interna-
tional law are part of the law which is in force within the state, the technique may 
also be considered as an application of the method of systematic interpretation.
When this technique is used, the decision of the court is, strictly speaking, 
based on rules of national law; the international law obligation at issue is only an 
underlying reason for a speciﬁc interpretation and application of these rules. In 
such cases international law has ‘indirect effect’ or is ‘applied indirectly’, viz. via 
domestic law.59 Of course the courts may sometimes deliberately construe and 
apply rules of national law in a manner that avoids a violation of obligations that 
international law has imposed on their states, without making references to these 
obligations. The Dutch courts, however, show no restraint in citing rules of inter-
57.  Hoge Raad, 12 Oktober 1984, NJ 1985, no. 230. Cf. P. van Dijk, ‘Domestic Status of 
Human Rights Treaties and the Atttude of the Judiciary: The Dutch Case’, in M. Nowak, et al., 
eds., Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte = Progress in the Spirit of 
Human Rights (Kehl am Rhein, Engel 1988) pp. 631-650.
58.  Hoge Raad, 12 May 1999, BNB (Beslissingen in belastingzaken. Nederlandse belasting-
rechtspraak) 1999, no. 271 (Arbeidskostenforfait). Cf. S.K. Martens, ‘De grenzen van de rechts-
vormende taak van de rechter’ (‘The limits of the law making task of the courts’), 75 Nederlands 
Juristenblad (2000) pp. 747-758.
59.  Cf. A. Nollkaemper and G. Betlem, ‘Giving Effect to Public International Law and Euro-
pean Community Law before Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of Con-
stistent Interpretation’, 14 EJIL (2003) pp. 569-589; P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Internationalisering van 
nationale rechtspraak’ (‘The internationalization of national case law’), Mededelingen NVIR No. 
131 (2005) p. 1 at pp. 43-46.
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national law, whenever those rules may be considered relevant for the outcome 
of the case. Consequently case law in which the method of consistent interpreta-
tion and application is used may be easily identiﬁed. This case law extends to 
customary international law as well as treaty law. Courts are especially keen to 
avoid that Dutch laws are applied in matters where the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands has no jurisdiction according to customary international law or treaty law. 
Thus the scope of national legislation will always be construed so that it does not 
exceed the limits that public international law has set on the jurisdiction of the 
state. Some acts contain provisions which explicitly state that their scope is lim-
ited by public international law, but these provisions are mere reminders and are 
therefore basically superﬂuous.60 For the most part, the case law on the technique 
of consistent interpretation and application relates to matters where the jurisdic-
tion of the state is beyond discussion, but where the point at issue is whether this 
jurisdiction has been exercised (by the legislature, by an administrative authority 
or by a lower court) in an manner that was in conformity with international law, 
often treaty law. Some famous examples predate the 1953 amendment of the 
Constitution. At the time legal doctrine was divided on the question whether a 
conﬂict between a treaty and an Act of Parliament was subjected to the ‘later in 
time rule’ or had always to be settled in favour of the treaty. By construing sub-
sequent Acts of Parliament to be in conformity with prior treaties, the Supreme 
Court managed for decades to avoid having to rule on this issue. It its judgment 
of 3 March 1919 the Supreme Court formulated the traditional rationale behind 
the method of consistent interpretation as follows:
‘It certainly can not be assumed that the Dutch legislature should in any act have 
deviated unilaterally and high-handedly from that which has been agreed upon 
in a ratified treaty with a foreign Power, unless the text of the act compels this 
assumption.’61
In 1934 the Supreme Court stretched the method to its utmost limits in a cou-
ple of judgments on the principle of free navigation as entailed in the Revised 
Mannheim Convention on Rhine Navigation 1868. A year earlier, in 1933, an 
Act of Parliament was enacted to provide for an equitable distribution of freight 
in inland shipping. To avoid a conﬂict between the Act and the prior treaty, the 
court held, as a matter of interpretation, that the Act was only applicable to the 
rivers that were not covered by the Revised Mannheim Convention. As a result 
the Act was largely bereft of its effect.62
60.  Kamerstukken II 1977/78, 15 049 (R 1100), no. 4, p. 24; Hoge Raad, 8 July 2008, LJN 
BC7418, RvdW 2008, no. 761, para. 6.6. Cf. H. Meijers, ‘Rond het internationale gewoonterecht 
in Nederland’ (‘Concerning customary international law in the Netherlands’), Mededelingen NVIR 
No. 91 (1985) p. 55 at pp. 105-108.
61.  Hoge Raad, 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (grenstractaat Aken).
62.  Hoge Raad, 17 December 1934, NJ 1935, p. 5; Hoge Raad, 17 December 1934, NJ 1935, 
p. 11. Cf. Verzijl 1968, supra n. 1, p. 122.
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In the 1953 amendment of the Constitution the precedence of treaties (and 
resolutions of international organizations) over subsequent Acts of Parliament 
and even over the Constitution itself was laid down. After the ‘supremacy clause’ 
had been restricted to self-executing provisions of treaty law, the technique of the 
consistent interpretation and application of domestic law became increasingly 
important once again. The technique is not only used with regard to those provi-
sions, but also as an instrument to make national law and its application comply 
with treaty law that is not deemed to be self-executing.63 In a judgment in which 
the Supreme Court had recourse to this technique, it held – without making a dis-
tinction between self-executing and non-self-executing provisions – that Dutch 
courts ‘should, as far as possible, construe and apply Dutch law in such a man-
ner that the State complies with its treaty obligations’.64 ‘Dutch law’ includes, of 
course, legislation, principles of law, customary law and discretionary powers 
of administrative authorities. This results in the conclusion that an afﬁrmative 
answer to the question whether a provision of treaty law is self-executing is only 
imperative to the extent that a violation of treaty obligations cannot be avoided 
by a consistent interpretation and application of written and unwritten legal rules, 
principles of law and discretionary powers. In numerous cases Dutch courts have 
used this technique to give a ruling that complies with a non-executing provision 
or to avoid a ruling on the question whether the provision at hand was self-exe-
cuting. But all too often courts dismiss a plea that is based on a provision of treaty 
law because they hold the provision to be non-self-executing, without examining 
whether there might be other means to take the provision into account.
5. ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE
Under Dutch law any natural or legal person whose interests are affected by an 
act or omission of the authorities or a private party can request the court to review 
the lawfulness of this act or omission. Almost any matter that is capable of being 
reviewed by legal standards may be taken to court. Thus the courts are also com-
petent to hear cases in which, for instance, peace activists try to obtain a ruling on 
the question whether a disputed government decision regarding defence strategy 
or the deployment of armed forces in military operations abroad constitutes a 
violation of public international law. The case law on issues of war and peace 
reached its climax in the above-mentioned judgment of 10 November 1989 (see 
supra 2.3). The Supreme Court did not hesitate to test a treaty that was concluded 
between the Netherlands and the United States as part of the NATO strategy to 
63.  For a recent example see, e.g., Voorzieningenrechter Arrondissementsrechtbank Zutphen, 
29 April 2010, LJN BM2856. I have discussed other instances in J.W.A. Fleuren, ‘Directe en indi-
recte toepassing van internationaal recht door de Nederlandse rechter’ (‘Direct and indirect appli-
cation of international law by the Dutch courts’), Mededelingen NVIR No. 131 (2005) p. 69 at 
pp. 90-97.
64.  Hoge Raad, 16 November 1990, NJ 1992, no. 107.
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renew its nuclear weapons arsenal against other treaties and rules of customary 
international law. Although the Supreme Court held that the Netherlands had not 
acted unlawfully by entering into the treaty, it pointed out that nothing prevented 
the courts from giving a ruling on the issue.65 The judgment has been strongly 
criticized by a former Advocate General at the Supreme Court. He argued that the 
Court should have declared itself incompetent to give an opinion on the lawful-
ness of the contested treaty; in other words, it should have resorted to a ‘political 
question doctrine’. Just as there are cases which are too trivial to be handled by 
the courts, there are cases in which too much is at stake. In his opinion the maxim 
de minimis non curat praetor should have a counterpart: de maximis non curat 
praetor.66
This criticism did not fall on deaf ears. Shortly after al-Qaeda had launched 
its attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Washington DC on 11 September 2001, the Supreme Court modiﬁed its case 
law. It is difﬁcult to say whether there is actually a link with these attacks, but it 
cannot be ruled out that in the aftermath of 9/11 the Supreme Court anticipated 
that without an adjustment to its case law the courts would increasingly become 
involved in matters that touched upon international relations, intelligence, and 
diplomatic and military strategy. However this may be, from the end of 2001 
onwards the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that the courts should 
exercise great restraint in allowing claims which concern ‘the policy of the State 
in matters of foreign affairs and defence’, as this policy ‘will strongly depend on 
political considerations connected to the context of the case’.67 So the Supreme 
Court did not have recourse to a fully-ﬂedged political question doctrine – it did 
not disqualify the courts from ruling on the lawfulness of government actions in 
matters of war and peace – but introduced a doctrine of judicial restraint instead. 
The courts are still empowered to examine such actions for compatibility with 
national and international law, but are urged to refrain from exercising this power 
in cases that are difﬁcult to assess. As a lower court once observed after it had 
made a reference to the modiﬁed case law of the Supreme Court: ‘Of course this 
does not alter the fact that in a State under the rule of law courts have to review 
independently whether other public bodies act lawfully.’68
65.  Hoge Raad, 10 November 1989, NJ 1991, no. 248; 22 NYIL (1991) p. 453 (kruisraketten).
66.  T. Koopmans, ‘Het leerstuk van de political question’ (‘The political question doctrine’), 
in M.G. Rood, ed., Rechters en politiek: Nationale en internationale beschouwingen (Judges and 
politics: National and international considerations) (Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1993) p. 9 at 
p. 20. Cf. T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative view (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press 2003) p. 104.
67.  Hoge Raad, 21 December 2001, LJN ZC3693, NJ 2002, no. 217; 34 NYIL (2003) p. 383 
(kernwapens); Hoge Raad, 29 November 2002, LJN AE5164, NJ 2003, no. 35; 35 NYIL (2004) 
p. 522 (Kosovo); Hoge Raad, 6 February 2004, LJN AN8071, NJ 2004, no. 329; ILDC 152 (NL 
2004) (Afghanistan).
68.  Voorzieningenrechter Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 4 mei 2005, LJN 
AT5152, NJF (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie Feitenrechtspraak) 2005, no. 262; ILDC 849 (NL 
2005) (President Bush).
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The doctrine of judicial restraint in matters of defence and foreign policy is not 
the only obstacle that may keep the courts from ruling that a contested govern-
ment decision on an issue of war and peace is wrongful. Another impediment is 
the holding of the Supreme Court that individuals cannot invoke the prohibition 
of the use of force before national courts, regardless of whether they rely on 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter or on the prohibition as part of customary inter-
national law.69 The ﬁrst time the Supreme Court passed judgment on this issue it 
referred for its substantiation to the advisory opinion of the Advocate General, 
who had submitted that, according to a generally accepted view, the prohibition 
of the use of force in international law was addressed to states only and may 
only be invoked by states.70 He, in turn, quoted a remark made by Randelzhofer 
in the commentary on the UN Charter that was edited by Simma: ‘Thus the pro-
hibition of the use of force indisputably only protects and is only addressed to 
states.’71 There is a serious ﬂaw in this reasoning. The quotation from Randelz-
hofer concerns the scope that, according to public international law, should be 
attached to the prohibition of the use of force. It does not imply an answer to 
the question whether individuals may invoke this prohibition before domestic 
courts in order to get a ruling on an alleged violation of this prohibition by their 
state. The answer to this question depends on the national law of the state that is 
summoned and cannot solely be derived from public international law. From the 
perspective of Dutch constitutional law an afﬁrmative answer would not have 
been indefensible. In view of the criteria for determining whether a treaty provi-
sion is self-executing which have been development in the landmark judgments 
I discussed in 3.2, it could easily be sustained that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
is binding on all persons within the meaning of the Constitution.72
6. EPILOGUE
Since the 1953 amendment of the Constitution the developments in the relation-
ship between international and Dutch law have mainly been dominated by the 
question of how to balance the duty of the courts to apply public international 
law, on the one hand, and the separation of powers between the legislature, the 
Government and the judiciary on the other. For the last two decades, however, 
yet another cause for concern has come into focus. The Netherlands’ Constitution 
bears witness to the great conﬁdence in the international rule of law. But since 
the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1985, Dutch 
69.  Hoge Raad, 29 November 2002, NJ 2003, no. 35; 35 NYIL (2004) p. 522 (Kosovo); Hoge 
Raad, 6 February 2004, NJ 2004, no. 329; ILDC 152 (NL 2004) (Afghanistan).
70.  Advisory opinion (conclusie) of Advocate-General Strikwerda, para. 30 (published in NJ 
2003, no. 35).
71.  A. Randelzhofer, in B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) Art. 2(4), MN 28. (The Advocate General quoted 
from the 1st edn. (1996)).
72.  See also Fleuren, supra n. 63, pp. 128-131.
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 lawyers have become increasingly aware of the fact that international coopera-
tion in matters such as aliens policy or the ﬁght against disorderly conduct, crime 
and terrorism may result in instruments of international law which interfere with 
civil rights, without providing for effective remedies for individuals whose rights 
are violated.73 Especially the resolutions of the UN Security Council whereby 
sanctions committees have been established and provided with the authority 
to designate individuals and non-state entities against whom states must target 
sanctions, for instance because of their involvement in ﬁnancing terrorism, have 
become notorious for their lack of legal protection.74 None of these resolutions 
grant to individuals and entities who have been listed by UN sanctions com-
mittees the right to have the matter reviewed by an independent tribunal. The 
inadequate legal protection against decisions of UN sanctions committees to list 
individuals and non-state entities has raised the question whether the Dutch Con-
stitution should not shield natural and legal persons from treaties and resolutions 
of international organizations which violate their basic rights, such as the right to 
a fair trial.75 In 2009 the Government set up an advisory committee in preparation 
for a constitutional revision, to which, inter alia, this question was submitted. The 
committee is expected to deliver its report before 1 October 2010.76 Meanwhile 
some scholars have already suggested exempting from the ‘supremacy clause’ 
those cases where the application of treaties and resolutions of international orga-
nizations would be inconsistent with fundamental legal principles.77
In my opinion such a modiﬁcation is not imperative. Like all legislation, the 
constitutional articles on the effect and supremacy of self-executing provisions 
of treaties and resolutions of international organizations should be construed 
and applied with the classical legal maxim quod raro ﬁt, non observant legis-
latores (the law does not take note of that which seldom occurs) at the back of 
one’s mind.78 In line with this maxim the courts tend to adopt a rather ﬂexible 
approach to these articles. We have already come across some examples. The 
mandatory wording of these articles did not stop the Supreme Court from exer-
cising restraint in cases where the application of self-executing provisions would 
compel the courts to make choices which should – at least initially – be left to 
the legislature (see supra 3.3.3). As the rulings in extradition and surrender cases 
73.  See, e.g., 16 NJCM-Bulletin (1991) pp. 803 et seq. (‘Schengen Special’).
74.  See, for instance, UNSC res. 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001).
75.  Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31 570, no. 3, pp. 21-25.
76.  KB 3 July 2009, Stcrt. (Staatscourant) 2009, no. 10354.
77.  M.L. van Emmerik, ‘De Nederlandse Grondwet in een veellagige rechtsorde’ (‘The Dutch 
Constitution in a multi-layered legal system’), 169 RM Themis (2008) p. 159; L.F.M. Besselink 
and R.A. Wessel, De invloed van ontwikkelingen in de internationale rechtsorde op de doorwer-
king naar Nederlands constitutioneel recht. Een ‘neo-monistische’ benadering (The inﬂuence of 
developments in the international legal order on direct effect in Dutch constitutional law. A ‘neo-
monistic’ approach) (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 2009) pp. 94, 107.
78.  A. Wacke, ‘Quod raro ﬁt, non observant legislatores: A Classical Maxim of Legislation’, 
in J.W. Cairns and O.F. Robinson, eds., Critical Studies in Ancient Law, Comparative Law and 
Legal History (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) pp. 393-398.
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show, the Government cannot enforce treaties and resolutions of international 
 organizations against individuals if this would result in a violation of their most 
basic human rights (see 3.3.1). Yet another example that should be mentioned 
here is a judgment of the Supreme Court in which it ruled that criminal liability 
could not be based on a treaty if the publication of the treaty did not contain an 
authentic text or translation in Dutch. Although this ruling was neither supported 
by the wording of the constitutional articles on self-executing treaties, nor by the 
wording of the Kingdom Act on the Approval and Publication of Treaties, the 
Supreme Court inferred the requirement that the publication of the treaty must 
include a Dutch text or translation from the constitutional article in which it is 
laid down that no offence shall be punishable unless it was an offence under the 
law at the time it was committed.79 In the reasoning of the Supreme Court this law 
must be available in Dutch or in a Dutch translation.80 In short, when dealing with 
public international law the courts have never been blind to constitutional prin-
ciples and personal rights and liberties. That UNSC resolutions obliging states to 
take measures against individuals and non-state entities are not exempted from 
this, is illustrated by a recent judgment of the District Court of The Hague. While 
the Court recognized that under Article 103 of the UN Charter resolutions of 
the UN Security Council prevail over obligations arising from other treaties, it 
nevertheless tested the way UNSC resolution 1737 (2006) was implemented in a 
bye-law against the prohibition of discrimination, embodied in Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. According to Article 
17 of this resolution the Security Council calls upon ‘all States to exercise vigi-
lance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within 
their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to 
Iran’s proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems’. Although this provision explicitly refers to Iranian 
nationals, the Court held that the bye-law made a distinction based on nationality 
that constituted a violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and therefore lacked binding force. To avoid a conﬂict with 
Article 17 of UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), the Court simply assumed that this 
article left the member states with sufﬁcient room to implement it in a manner 
that would not be inconsistent with Article 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.81
However, the imagination the courts have to show now and again in order 
to avoid that compliance with the international law obligations of the state will 
result in violations of personal rights and liberties reveals that in the international 
legal order the development of the rule of law has not always been keeping pace 
with the ever increasing impact that public international law is having on the 
lives of individuals. In the long run this might even subvert the authority of (some 
parts of) public international law. In this respect it may be taken as a warning 
79.  Art. 16 Const.
80.  Hoge Raad, 24 June 1997, NJ 1998, no. 70.
81.  Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 3 February 2010, LJN BL1862.
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that the Government has been seeking advice on the question whether a clause 
should be inserted in the Constitution to shield individuals from self-executing 
provisions of treaties and resolutions of international organizations which are 
inconsistent with the rule of law. In the introduction to this article I stated that 
in the Kingdom of the Netherlands the relationship between public international 
law and domestic law is deeply rooted in the monistic tradition. At present the 
best way of supporting this tradition would be to promote as ﬁrmly as possible 
the development of the rule of law within the international legal order. On the 
threshold of the second century of its existence, this is one of the challenges the 
Netherlands Society of International Law will be faced with.
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